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Executive Registry
80-7219

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 96/80
6 June 1980
Copy 1*DCI review 6/10/90 by SecDef at 6/10/90 meeting*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment *Reu*

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Talking Points to be Used with the Secretary of Defense Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80 (U)

REFERENCES: (a) Memcon of DCI/SecDef on NIE 11-3/8-79, dated 11 March 1980
 (b) SecDef Memorandum X07843, dated 15 April 1980
 (c) Memorandum for Record, SP-95/80, dated 6 June 1980
 (Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Capabilities)

1. Action Requested: That you use the attached talking points at an upcoming meeting with the Secretary of Defense to discuss our plans for producing NIE 11-3/8-80. (C)

2. Background:

a. The production of NIE 11-3/8-79 was delayed somewhat by incorporating the SAGA study findings in the Estimate, then removing both the SAGA study and US No-SALT forces at Secretary Brown's request (Reference a).

b. We believe it is incumbent upon us this year to complete the NIE by early November.

--In the last two years, the complexity of producing NIE 11-3/8 has resulted in its being issued several months after the November completion date desired by consumers. Moreover, preparation of the NIE has been burdensome on every one involved in its preparation. We wish, therefore, to complete this year's NIE on schedule.

OSD has no objection to declassification and release.

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SP - 96/80

SUBJECT: Talking Points to be Used with the Secretary of Defense
Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80

--Some of our consumers, particularly in the DoD, report that the delays of recent years have complicated matters for US force planners.

--In a Presidential election year it is desirable to have our annual analysis of the strategic situation in print in November, the normal scheduled date for issuing the NIE.

c. It would, therefore, be highly desirable for you to discuss with Secretary Brown requirements for US force data and projections for this year's NIE.

--We would prefer to follow this year's example of not including results from the JCS/SAGA analysis in the NIE which Secretary Brown clearly favors.

--We propose including the several types of indexes comparing Soviet and US forces, including residuals, in this year's NIE as a basis for general conclusions about trends. We would include residuals among the indexes, despite the objections of DoD intelligence agencies. Aside from the issue of turf about net assessments, this approach is consistent with Secretary Brown's position in his 15 April 1980 memorandum (Reference b, attached) that no single set of exchange calculations can depict the US-USSR strategic balance. (Key consumers are divided on the issue of net assessments in NIE 11-3/8. See Reference c attached.)

--In contrast to NIE 11-3/8-79, we need to compare Soviet No-SALT projected forces with a US No-SALT force(s). A future strategic environment is at least as likely without SALT II as with it. Moreover, the President's recent request for additional SALT/No-SALT comparisons reinforces the need for the DoD to provide us both US SALT-limited and No-SALT forces.

--We have not yet decided on the rationale and assumptions for alternative projections of Soviet forces with and without SALT II. Secretary Brown may have some views about the alternative Soviet force options he would like the NIE to contain.

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SP - 96/80

SUBJECT: Talking Points to be Used with the Secretary of Defense
Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80

d. We are preparing to launch the production of NIE 11-3/8-80 on a schedule which will achieve an early November completion date. Secretary Brown's agreement to provide us US force data and any views he may have about alternative Soviet force projections will assist us greatly in our efforts to carry out this task. (S)

3. Recommendation: That you use the attached talking points to discuss our plans and requirements with Secretary Brown. (U)



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David S. Brandwein


Attachments

cc: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

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- I strongly
agree with Dan's
proposal + hope
you can talk up
with Harold -



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SP - 96/80

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Regarding NIE 11-3/8-80

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
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


12 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense, 11 March 1980

1. We disposed of the NIE 11-3/8 problem very quickly. I told the Secretary we were taking the US No SALT projections and all SAGA material. He said to me then, "It will be just like last year." I said yes, it will be just like last year, updated. He said that was fine with him. The Secretary incidentally said that he had no objection to our doing net assessments. He just didn't want them in NIE's because of the stature they had. In talking with General Smith also, I detected the line of argumentation against continuing even our quasi-dynamic analyses will be that the NIE has such stature and these are so subject to misinterpretation that we shouldn't risk that. (S/NOFORN)




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STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 APR 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Assessments of the Strategic Balance

Attached are two analyses of trends in indices, static and dynamic, of the strategic balance. Both report calculations of force exchange outcomes under a range of assumptions. One was prepared by SAGA under the supervision of a Net Assessment Advisory Committee, and addresses itself to the future strategic balance under SALT II. The other was prepared by PA&E to provide a more thorough discussion of the strategic balance calculations which appeared in the Department of Defense Annual Report.

I am circulating these analyses because of the interest of other agencies in assessments of the current and likely future state of the strategic balance. But these analyses, while they provide useful inputs to an assessment of that balance, do not in themselves provide a sufficient basis for such an assessment. Like all such analyses, they depend for their results entirely on assumptions about the composition and performance of U.S. and Soviet forces, unique scenarios and the tactics each would employ.

Assessing the strategic balance requires analysis and judgments that go far beyond the relatively narrow set of factors and contingencies that current exchange calculations are able to include. An outstanding example is that these analyses do not evaluate the effects of attacks on command, control, and intelligence upon the performance of the forces. Another is that these analyses focus exclusively on the outcomes of major exchanges in which each side adopts a highly stylized single set of attack objectives. They do not compare U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the other situations where we expect them to play a role: crisis, theater war, escalation, LNOs, nuclear conflict which takes place over an extended period of time, and continued military operations after the major exchange.

Even if these formal calculations were more comprehensive, the adequacy of our strategic posture could be assessed only by including judgments about how Soviet assessments are likely to differ from ours. Deterrence is our first objective. That makes the Soviet assessment, not ours, the critical issue.

Harold Brown

Attachments

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 95/80
6 June 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Capabilities (U)

1. The attachment is a detailed account of a meeting of key consumers on 29 May 1980 called by Mr. Bruce Clarke to obtain comments on NIE 11-3/8-79, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict in the 1980s." (U)

2. Comments of the participants which are most important to planning for production of national intelligence on Soviet strategic nuclear programs:

a. An annual NIE is required in the last quarter of the calendar year.

b. The NIE should contain a comprehensive treatment of all strategic offensive and defensive forces (a compendium).

c. The NIE need not be completely rewritten each year; it should be updated as required.

d. The format, printing and graphics of the NIE are excellent.

e. The participants were divided on the issue of whether net assessments, that is, the results of exchange calculations depicting the relationship of Soviet and US offensive forces, should be in the NIE. Department of Defense participants were adamantly opposed. NSC Staff and Department of State participants believed the NIE should contain such assessments, and the ACDA representative implied that they should. All participants agreed that assessments of the US-USSR strategic nuclear balance by the US government require improvement.

f. The material in Chapters I, II, III and IV covering Soviet policies and doctrine, offensive and defensive forces and operational capabilities are most important to consumers and should receive priority attention.

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SP - 95/80

SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Capabilities

g. Department of Defense consumers wanted Volume I of the NIE to be a faithful summary of the longer Estimate. (Other consumers were silent on this issue and none addressed whether the volumes should cover only NIE findings of most significance to high level consumers as recommended previously by the NIE consultants, or whether it should summarize the entire Estimate.)

h. Among the suggested topics for improved treatment in the NIE, the participants placed most importance on Soviet command, control and communications--capabilities, vulnerabilities, implications. Other topics mentioned were:

--Launch-under-attack.

--Implications of strategic exercises.

--Effectiveness of possible ballistic missile defense.

--Implications of advanced technology.

i. In content and presentation of material, the participants recommended that the NIE

--Contain more citations to the evidential and analytical bases for key findings, particularly on soft, subjective conclusions.

--Contain footnote references to key source studies and estimates.

--Highlight for the reader substantive changes from the previous issuance of the NIE. (S)

3. The consumer group did not address the following key issues pertinent to this year's NIE 11-3/8.

a. Whether our forecasts of Soviet forces should be based primarily on the assumption that SALT II would not be ratified.

b. The assumptions which should underly our alternative projections of offensive Soviet forces.

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SP - 95/80

SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Capabilities

c. Consumer interest in the integration of developments in Soviet strategic programs into a broader assessment of overall Soviet military capability and its implications for Soviet foreign policies. (S)



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David S. Brandwein
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachment

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SP - 95/80

SUBJECT: Comments of Key Consumers of NIE 11-3/8, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Capabilities

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- 15 -
- 16 -
- 17 -
- 18 -
- 19 - Leicester W. Cook, State/INR
- 20 - Michael P. Elcano, Army/ACSI
- 21 - Eugene E. Rodenburg, Navy/OP-009F
- 22 - LTC. Verne V. Wattawa, Air Force
- 23 -
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Briefing [redacted] on Intelligence Matters

- ST trip
- Intelligence relations

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• [redacted] weapons

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• [redacted]

• 200 Redeye - \$3M

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• Soundup for HB for 6/26

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